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Abstract
Shareholders of a target company must be well informed of the merits of a 
takeover bid for their shares. The takeovers law requires the board of the bidder 
to provide all information necessary to enable the shareholders of the target to 
arrive at an informed decision. In addition, the board of the target company is 
also required to appoint an independent adviser to assist the shareholders in 
making their decision. The Securities Commission Malaysia (SC) has published 
a consultation paper in March 2010 with the aim of improving the quality 
of independent advice circulars. The SC suggests that when arriving at its 
opinion, an independent adviser should see that the takeover bid is “fair” 
and “reasonable”. The SC chooses to adopt the Australian approach which 
decouples the terms “fair and reasonable”. This article examines the criteria 
which are laid down by the SC for an offer to be “fair” and “reasonable”. It 
also examines the contents of independent advice circulars in Malaysia and 
their usefulness to the shareholders when assessing the merits of the bid.
Introduction
Shareholders of a company enjoy many benefits during the good days of 
the company’s life. When the company becomes a target of a takeover, the 
shareholders are placed in a quandary to decide whether to remain in the 
company or exit the company. They generally look forward to getting the best 
value for their shares before they decide to give up their shares. Shareholders 
in a public listed company may easily refer to the market price to determine 
the minimum price for their shares. However, for a non-listed company, the 
shareholders will have to exert more efforts to determine the value for their 
shares. Thus disclosure of information is a very significant factor in determining 
the right value for the shares and assists shareholders, in a takeover, to make 
an informed decision when deciding to sell their shares to a bidder. A valuation 
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of the company and its assets by a professional will assist in determining the 
right value for the shares.
The Malaysian takeovers and mergers law seeks to protect the shareholders 
of the target company. In view of this, the Malaysian Code on Take-overs 
and Mergers 1998 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”) was formulated 
to ensure that the acquisition of control over a company takes place in an 
efficient, competitive and informed market.1 It also aims at ensuring that 
all the shareholders affected by a takeover are given reasonable and equal 
opportunity to participate in any benefits accruing to the holders.2 The law 
applies to all public companies whether listed or unlisted. In order to ensure 
that the target shareholders arrive at an informed decision, the Code requires 
the board of the target company to appoint an independent adviser upon 
whom an obligation is imposed to prepare a report in order to provide all 
such information as is necessary in relation to the takeover.
In March 2010, the Securities Commission (hereinafter referred to as “the 
Commission”) proposed a review of the content of independent advice circulars 
(hereinafter referred to as “IACs”) to enhance the quality of advice circulars 
and reliability by target shareholders upon such advice. The review arises 
from the Commission’s concern with the quality of information in the IACs 
with a view to enhancing the protection for shareholders.3 The Commission 
published a public consultation paper where it proposes to decouple the 
phrase “fair and reasonable” when evaluating takeover offers with a view to 
improving the standard measurement that advisers use.4 It is worth noting 
that despite the fact that the Code requires the adviser to evaluate on the 
“reasonableness” of an offer, in practice advisers have prepared their advice 
on the basis of evaluating whether the offer is “fair and reasonable”.5 The 
phrase “fair and reasonable” in relation to a takeover offer has never been 
defined in Malaysia. Thus the Commission seeks to ensure that independent 
advisers, when stating whether the offer is “fair and reasonable”, undertake 
“sufficient analysis and synthesis in reaching to such conclusion”.6
The aim of this paper is to examine the move by the Commission to decouple 
the term “fair and reasonable” when assessing the takeover offer. In view 
of this, the author carried out a study on the IACs from the year 2009 up to 
 1 Capital Markets and Services Act 2007, s 217(5).
 2 Ibid.
 3 Securities Commission Malaysia, “Proposed updates to guidelines on offer documentation 
of the Malaysian Code on Take-overs and Mergers 1998, Public consultation paper 
No 2/2010 (March 19, 2010), available online at http://www.sc.com.my/eng/html/
consultation/CP_02_2010_IAC_Guidelines.pdf, p 3, para 1.6.
 4 Ibid.
 5 Schedule 2(1)(e) to the Code states that the IAC, when recommending acceptance or rejection 
of the takeover offer, must contain comments and advice on the reasonableness of the take-
over offer.
 6 Public Consultation Paper, No 2/2010, supra, n 3, at p 2.
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June 2010. This paper discusses the inconsistencies in the IACs. It further 
analyses how the IACs can be enhanced by treating “fairness” and 
“reasonableness” as two different concepts and whether such an approach 
will reduce the inconsistencies in the IACs and improve their quality. Since the 
Commission’s approach reflects the adoption of the “fair” and “reasonable” 
definition in line with the Australian practice, the author will make reference 
to the Australian guidelines on the expert report to shed some light onto the 
discussion.
What is Independent Advice Circular (IAC)?
The expert report, more commonly known as the independent advice circular 
in Malaysia is a report specially prepared by an independent adviser or 
expert in assisting the shareholders of the target to make their decision as 
to whether to accept or reject a takeover bid. Thus, the independent advice 
circular becomes relevant in all types of takeover offers; be it a voluntary or 
mandatory offer. It must also be noted that in cases of reverse takeovers, the 
board of the bidder is under an obligation to obtain independent advice for 
their shareholders. The reason being that in a reverse takeover, the control 
would pass from the bidder to the target company. It is worth noting that 
where the bidder revises its offer, the Commission may require the independent 
adviser to produce a supplementary independent advice letter. This advice 
letter is commonly required where there has been a significant change in the 
content of the IAC sent earlier.
In Malaysia, an independent advice letter is also required in cases involving 
schemes of arrangement and selective capital reduction.
When is an independent advice circular required?
In line with the aim of the takeovers law which seeks to ensure that takeovers 
take place in an efficient and informed market, the law imposes an obligation 
upon the board of the target to provide their shareholders with adequate 
information to enable the shareholders to make an informed decision. Section 
15 of the Code requires the board of the target to appoint an independent 
adviser in relation to a takeover offer as soon as after it becomes aware of 
the possibility that a takeover offer may be made.7 The independent adviser’s 
view on the offer must then be made known to the holders of voting shares 
in the target through a circular. An independent advice circular thus seeks 
to assist the shareholders of the target in determining the real value of their 
shares and assist the board of the target in determining whether or not to 
recommend a takeover offer. In a reverse takeover, the board of the bidder is 
required to obtain independent advice and the circular must be circulated to 
its shareholders.8 Similarly, where the bidder is faced with a conflict of interest 
 7 See the Code, s 15(1) and PN 4.2.
 8 The Code, s 15(4).
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situation, for instance where there are significant cross-shareholdings between 
a bidder and the target company or where there are a number of directors 
common to both companies, the law requires the bidder to obtain an IAC.9 
Prior consent must be obtained from the Commission before the board of the 
target can send the IAC to its shareholders.10 This is to ensure that the IAC 
complies with the requirements of the Code and the guidelines as required 
by the Commission. The IAC must be posted to the relevant holders of voting 
rights within 10 days from the date the offer document is posted, the same 
day on which the board of the target must give its comment to the holders 
of the securities on whether to accept or reject the offer.
The holders of the securities would be more likely to accept the offer where 
the price offered by the bidder reflects a value higher than the market value for 
the securities. It is worth noting that where the target is a listed company and 
the offer is a mandatory offer, it is much easier to assess the offer price since 
the minimum price as determined by the Code is the highest price paid for 
the shares by the bidder during six months prior to the making of the offer.11 
Similarly, in a voluntary offer where a bidder has purchased 10% or more of 
the shares of the target company six months prior to the takeover offer and 
paid the consideration in cash, the Code imposes the minimum price for the 
shares in the target to be the highest price paid for the shares by the bidder 
during six months prior to the making of the bid.12 However, in a voluntary 
offer which does not involve the situation mentioned earlier and where the 
company’s shares are not listed, careful attention must be given in order to 
see whether the offer is fair and reasonable.
Who is an independent adviser?
Section 217(1) of the Capital Markets and Services Act 2007 defines an expert to 
include an engineer, valuer, accountant and any person whose profession gives 
authority to a statement made by him. This definition is further elaborated in 
Practice Note (PN) 1.3 to the court where an adviser is referred to as a person 
who has the necessary expertise and experience in corporate matters.13 Prior to 
the appointment of the adviser, the board of the target must obtain approval 
from the Commission.14 The Commission will examine the independence of 
the adviser proposed by the company before approving such appointment. 
An independent adviser should strive to provide objective and clear advice 
which would enable shareholders to exercise their judgment. In carrying out 
 9 The Code, s 15(2). The above instances which relates to conflict of interest is explained in 
notes on Rule 3.2, The Code.
 10 The Code, s 15(6). The approval however does not indicate the Commission agrees with 
the recommendation made by the independent adviser. See s 15(6A).
 11 The Code, s 20.
 12 The Code, s 21(1).
 13 PN 3.1 (1).
 14 The Code, s 15(8).
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its task, the adviser must adhere to the relevant laws to avoid any negligence 
or false or misleading information.15
The supervisory role of the Commission in the appointment of an 
independent adviser
The Commission plays a significant role in approving the appointment of 
an independent adviser to ensure that the adviser to be appointed is able 
to undertake its tasks in providing independent advice. The importance 
to observe high standards by those who prepare the expert report can be 
observed in Phosphate Co-operative Co of Australia Ltd v Shears (No 3)16 where 
Brooking J said:
Unless high standards are observed by those who prepare those reports, 
there is a danger that systems established for the protection of investing 
public will, in fact, operate through their detriment through reliance placed 
on these reports and on the reputations of those who furnish them.
In the appointment process, the Commission is guided by PN 4.3 as discussed 
below. Prior consultation in relation to the preparation of the IAC with the 
Commission is very important. The advisers are required to communicate 
with the Commission in writing all matters which they seek to discuss prior 
to the consultation. The advisers must clearly define the issues on which they 
seek the advice of the Commission and be thoroughly familiar with the issues 
relating to the obligation under Part II of the Code and be able to provide 
their views on the issues referred to the Commission.17 The Commission will 
scrutinise the content of the IAC to ensure compliance with the guidelines 
and the Code.
Disqualified advisers
The Commission will not regard as an appropriate and independent adviser a 
person who has an interest in 10% or more of the voting shares in the bidder or 
the target during the offer period or during the preceding last 12 months.18 The 
Practice Note requires the adviser to have a sufficient degree of independence 
from the bidder and the target from any situation that can create a conflict of 
interest to ensure that the advice given is properly objective.19 Accordingly, 
where the adviser has a significant interest in or financial connection with 
either the bidder or the target, it would be presumed that the adviser lacks 
independency.20 Similarly, where there is cross directorship between the adviser 
with either the bidder or the target, the adviser is disqualified from acting 
 15 False and misleading information is governed by s 38 of the Code.
 16 (1988) 14 ACLR 336.
 17 PN 1.3(8).
 18 PN 4.3.
 19 PN 4.3.
 20 PN 4.3.
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as an independent adviser. It thus can be observed that the law requires the 
adviser to be independent of both the bidder and the target.
What is the content of the IAC?
The IAC must provide all such information as the shareholders, the board of 
the target and their professional advisers would reasonably require for the 
purpose of making an informed assessment as to the merits of the offer.21 The 
IAC must disclose, inter alia, brief information of the bidder and the target.22 
Where the offer is a mandatory offer, details of the transaction which led to 
the triggering of the offer must also be included.23
The Code clearly states that the adviser must disclose all such information to 
the holder of the voting shares to which the takeover offer relates.24
Schedule 2 to the Code provides detailed guidelines for the IAC. It requires 
the disclosure of all information which may assist the target shareholders 
in making an informed decision. Most importantly, the details of the offer 
must be laid out; the salient terms and conditions of the offer including the 
consideration, the condition, and the duration of the offer and the method of 
settlement need to be stated clearly. When evaluating the offer, the adviser 
needs to look at the rationale for the offer and the bidder’s plan for the target. 
Further, the adviser must take into account the bidder’s intention with regard 
to the continued employment of the employees in the target company and 
of its subsidiaries. The impact of a takeover can be tremendous. It may, for 
instance involve a target which will immediately be liquidated following the 
completion of the takeover while the white knight who took over the company 
retains the subsidiary which is still a profit making company.25
The IAC should also include the directors’ interests in the bidder as well as 
the target. Service contracts of the directors and any of the target subsidiaries 
must be sufficiently disclosed. The IAC must also include the board’s 
recommendation.26 The independent adviser is required to comment on the 
“reasonableness” of the offer and state its advice whether to accept or reject the 
offer.27 The task of an independent adviser, as observed, is not only to assess 
whether the offer is reasonable but also to firmly state whether shareholders 
should accept or reject the offer. Where the takeover document contains 
a profit forecast, the adviser must evaluate on the reasonableness and the 
 21 The Code, s 15(9).
 22 PN 1.3(7).
 23 PN 1.3(7).
 24 The Code, s 15(9).
 25 See the recent takeover of Maika Holdings by G Team Resources: “Westport’s executive 
chairman to take over Maika Holdings”, The Star, April 22, 2010.
 26 Document Guidelines 3.2.
 27 The Code, Sch 2 para 1(e).
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accuracy of the forecast as well.28 The adviser may also include in the report 
the limitation to the evaluation of the offer.
The directors may rely on the advice given by the adviser when recommending 
the shareholders to accept or reject the offer. It should be noted, however, 
that in the absence of detailed information on each shareholder, it will not be 
possible for the directors to know whether the recommendation suits each and 
every shareholder. Therefore, the advice given by the directors will normally 
require the shareholders to assess the information available to them or hire 
a professional to advise them on the suitability of the offer to their interests. 
Conversely, the directors may differ in their views with the one expressed 
by the independent adviser.
The board of the target directors’ recommendation in response to the bidder’s 
offer document is made in writing. An IAC is attached to it before it is sent 
to the shareholders of the target.29
Independent Advice Circulars: A closer look
As noted above, the purpose for requiring the IAC is to assist the holders of the 
voting shares. Since the independent adviser has to comply with the Guidelines 
on Offer Documentation when preparing the IAC, we can observe a standard 
format and structure in the IACs. The author conducted a study on the IACs 
prepared from the year 2009 up to June 2010. A total of 15 IACs were reviewed. 
The author examined the report made by independent advisers focusing on 
the evaluation of the offer.30 The following can be observed from the study:
The evaluation of the offer
In evaluating the offer, the following factors are taken into consideration:
 (1) The rationale for the offer
  The independent adviser will consider whether the rationale for the 
offer is considered reasonable. Below are some of the instances relating 
to the rationale of the offer:
 28 The Code, Sch 2.
 29 The letter from the board of the target should elaborate on the details of the offer and its 
terms and conditions, which include the consideration, condition and duration of the offer, 
procedure for acceptance and the method of payment. It also provides the evaluation of the 
offer which includes the rationale, financial evaluation, industry outlook and the future of 
the target. Finally it includes the recommendation by the board of the target.
 30 Generally the letter from the independent adviser should include the following:
 i. Introduction of the offer;
 ii. The terms of offer;
 iii. Limitations to the evaluation of the offer;
 iv. Evaluation of the offer comprising of the rationale, financial evaluation, industry 
outlook and future prospects; and
 v. Conclusion and recommendation.
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 (a) the bidder has triggered the mandatory general offer (MGO) and 
it is mandatory for the bidder to make an offer to all the remaining 
holders of the voting rights in the target company;
 (b) the bidder wishes to delist the target with a view to undertaking 
the restructuring and reorganisation exercise in order to achieve 
the target business objective;
 (c) the bidder and the target have definite plans to expand and diversify 
the business of the target;
 (d) the bidder intends to liquidate the target company and take control 
of the profit generating subsidiary.31
 (2) Financial evaluation of the offer
  When making financial evaluation of the offer, the independent adviser 
takes into account, among other things:
 (a) The historical share prices and trading volume of the target to reflect the 
prevalent market assessment of its value. The IAC provides the historical 
market prices with the statistic/data mostly relying on Bloomberg. 
The study on the IACs reveals that there is no fixed period used in 
the IAC when projecting the historical share prices. The duration 
of the historical performance of the target ranges from a minimum 
of one year to a maximum of three years.32
 (b) A relative valuation of the offer with comparable companies. The 
independent adviser confines the list to mostly listed companies 
having similar principal activities with the target. It is however worth 
noting that the evaluation of the companies in a similar industry 
may not be directly comparable to the target due to various factors, 
which include among others, different asset bases, geographical 
location, marketability and liquidity of the shares, size and diversity 
of the respective businesses, profit track record, financial strengths 
and prospects.
 (d) Comparison with the offer price of takeovers in companies having the same 
principal activities with the target. There is no standard period applied 
in the IACs. The study shows that the independent adviser takes into 
account the offer price paid to the comparable companies ranging 
from a duration of three months to 12 months. The independent 
adviser will then assess whether the premium offered to the 
target shareholders is on par with the average premium offered 
to comparable companies which had undergone takeovers. The 
current practice as recommended by the Commission is to include 
 31 Maika Holdings takeover by G Team Resources & Holdings Sdn Bhd.
 32 Based on IACs prepared in 2009 to June 2010.
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the offer price of comparable companies for 12 months preceding 
the takeover.
 (3) Overview and prospects of the industry in which the target group operates
  The IAC will state the prospects of the target against the country’s 
economic background. The independent adviser also takes into account 
the prospects and outlook for the country’s economy and examines the 
possibility for positive growth in the economy and the impact of such 
economic improvement on the target company in the future. In certain 
cases, depending on the nature of the target’s business, the IAC also 
takes into account political factors and economic risks in the country 
and neighbouring countries.
 (4) Financial performance of the target
  The independent adviser will normally summarise the financial 
performance of the target based on the respective audited consolidated 
financial statements of the target. The study reveals that the duration 
applied differs from case to case. In the study carried out on the IAC, the 
audited consolidated financial statement as applied by the independent 
adviser ranges from 15 months to five years whereas the unaudited 
consolidated result ranges from six months period to nine months.
 (5) Prospects of the target or the target group
  The independent adviser evaluates the prospect of the target in the short 
term and medium term and the strategies for the various businesses 
carried out by the target and the target group.
 (6) Other considerations
  Other factors which the independent adviser has also taken into account 
include matters relating to the bidder’s intention to delist the target or 
whether the bidder intends to compulsorily acquire the shares from 
dissenting shareholders under s 222 of the Capital Markets and Services 
Act 2007.
It is worth noting that from the observation made on the IACs, those IACs 
prepared prior to March 2010 also include the possible scenarios that the 
shareholders may encounter. For example, the independent adviser will 
lay down the effect of the offer where the bidder manages to secure 90% 
acceptances which will give rise to the bidder’s right to invoke their compulsory 
acquisition power and the situation where 90% acceptances are not obtained. 
The inclusion of the above scenarios may not be much of assistance to the 
shareholders. The author observed that the IACs also include the long-term 
and short-term view to cater for shareholders who at the time of buying the 
shares intend to stay in the company rather than exiting the company and 
realising their investment whenever opportunity presents itself. The author 
observed changes in the IACs submitted to the Commission from the month 
Shareholders’ Protection Through the Enhanced Independent Advice Circular
The Law Review 201126
of March 2010. The IACs have also included the basis and assumptions of the 
valuation which they adopted. The independent adviser also disclosed the 
appropriate valuation methodologies and the justification for the adoption of 
such methodology in evaluating the target.33 They also include the analysis of 
dividend yield and analysis of capital value, where the independent adviser 
states whether there is a potential gain if holders were to accept the offer.
Apart from forming its opinion on whether the offer is “fair and reasonable” 
the adviser is also required to advise the shareholders whether to accept or 
reject the offer. Such advice can be found in the final part of the IAC in the 
“conclusion and recommendation” part.
What is a fair and reasonable offer?
As a matter of convention, independent advisers have evaluated on the 
“fairness and reasonableness” of an offer despite the fact that the Code 
requires the adviser to evaluate only on the “reasonableness” of the offer.34 
The Commission has allowed independent advisers to evaluate the offer based 
on the “fair and reasonable” standard as it is in consistent with an approach 
in other jurisdictions.35 The Consultation paper made reference to s 640 of the 
Australian Corporations Act 2001, which requires that a target’s statement 
given in accordance with s 638 must include, or be accompanied by, a report 
by an expert that states whether, in the expert’s opinion, the takeover offers 
are fair and reasonable. Section 640 also requires an expert to give the reasons 
for forming such opinion.
The phrase “fair and reasonable” in normal legal usage is treated as a 
composite term; it is a single expression which has normally been taken to 
convey a single overall meaning. In Australia, however, when takeover bids 
are involved it has been a practice that the words “fair and reasonable” in 
s 640 are treated as two distinct criteria.36 In Re Rancoo Ltd37 Hayne J when 
referring to the phrase “fair and reasonable” said:
 33 Different valuation methodology is used which includes the discounted flow method, the 
RNAV method, the earnings multiple approach method. The improvement on financial 
evaluation of the offer can be seen in IAC submitted on March 20, 2010.
 34 The Code, Sch 2 para 1(e).
 35 See Public Consultation Paper No 2/2010, supra, n 3, p4, para 3.1.2. Rule 2 of the Hong 
Kong Code on Takeovers and Mergers and Share Repurchases specifically requires a 
financial adviser to state whether the offer is “fair and reasonable”. Similarly s 640 of the 
Australian Corporations Act 2001 requires the expert to state whether the offer is “fair” and 
“reasonable”. On the other hand, in New Zealand and Singapore, no specific requirement 
exists as to the offer to be “fair and reasonable”. However, as a matter of practice, the “fair 
and reasonable” standard is widely used by independent advisers.
 36 See Australian Securities and Investment Commission, Content of Expert Report, Regulatory 
Guide 111 (October 2007) at RG 111.9.
 37 (1995) 17 ACSR 206 at 207, cited in Hulme, S E K, “Section 640 of the Corporations Law: 
Independent Experts’ Reports and the RTZ Ltd Takeover of Comalco Ltd” (2001) 19 Company 
& Securities Law Journal 134 at 141.
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… the impression I have is that “fair and reasonable” is but a single expression 
intended to convey a single overall meaning which is not to be identified 
by reference to particular constituent elements.”
The empirical study carried out by the author on the IACs clearly shows 
that as a matter of practice, independent advisers have treated “fair and 
reasonable” as a composite term. It’s worth noting that despite the widespread 
usage of the term “fair and reasonable” in the IACs in Malaysia, neither the 
Code nor the court has formulated a precise, uniform definition of a “fair 
and reasonable” offer.
Defining “fair” and “reasonable”
What is “fair and reasonable” by definition varies from transaction to transaction. 
How one defines fair and reasonable in one transaction will greatly affect what 
price may be considered fair and reasonable in another. The Commission now, 
in its review, steps in to inform the adviser what is it to look at in forming its 
opinion whether the offer is “fair” and “reasonable”. In the Consultation Paper, 
the Commission stated that its aim is to “provide a simple and clear framework 
for analysis that can be easily understood by users”.38 The Paper made a reference 
to s 640 of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 which applies to on-market 
and off-market takeover offers.39 A target statement issued in response to the 
bidder’s statement must contain the report of an expert giving an opinion as 
to whether the takeover offer is fair and reasonable and setting out the reasons 
for forming that opinion.40 The Consultation paper also made reference to the 
Regulatory Guide 111 issued by the ASIC which provides guidance on how to 
draft an expert report in line with the requirements of the Australian takeover 
law. RG 111 outlines the nature of the opinion which is required from the 
expert and discusses the considerations underlying the concepts of fairness 
and reasonableness which the expert should assess.41
“Fair”
The Guidelines on Offer Documentation require independent advisers to 
assess the “fairness” of the offer. The Commission now proposes that the term 
“fair” in relation to the offer price must be at least equal to the value of the 
 38 Public Consultation Paper No 2/2010, supra, n 3, p 8.
 39 Renard, I and Santamaria, J, Takeovers and Reconstructions in Australia (Sydney: LexisNexis 
Butterworths, looseleaf), section [2012].
 40 Renard, I and Santamaria, J, supra, n 39. The Corporations Law, s 640 requires an expert’s 
opinion where the bidder company has at least 30% voting power in the target company 
or the bidder and the target share common directors. Expert’s opinion is equally required 
under ss 611, 667A and ASX LR Ch 10. It is however worth noting that ASIC applies important 
differences in the meaning of and considerations underlying the ‘fair and reasonable” test in 
the context of s 640 as compared to s 611. See Renard, I and Santamaria, J, supra, n 39 at [2012].
41  Renard, I and Santamaria, J, supra, n 39.
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securities.42 The proposed guidelines tie the question of “fairness” to value 
alone. Thus when forming its opinion on whether the offer is “fair” or not, 
an independent adviser must only look at the value of the securities. This 
approach follows RG 111.10 which indicates that the Australian Securities and 
Investment Commission (ASIC) views fairness as a quantitative consideration 
which involves a comparison of the value to be surrendered versus the value 
to be received under a proposed transaction.43
How should the adviser assess the value of the offer? There are a variety of 
valuation methods available to the adviser when assessing the value of the 
offer. The Commission leaves the adviser to choose the valuation methodology 
based on the adviser’s skill and judgment.44 The Commission however provides 
guidance on how experts should analyse a proposed transaction.45 Firstly, 
the adviser must use more than one valuation methodology and justify its 
choice of methodologies.46 The choice of the methodologies however must 
be an appropriate one.47 An inappropriate choice of valuation methodology 
might be misleading. In addition, failure to take sufficient care and skill in 
the preparation of the advice circular will expose the adviser to liability.48
Secondly, the adviser must compare and comment on the differences and the 
results of the methodologies used in the valuation. Thirdly, the adviser must 
base its valuation on reasonable assumptions and disclose all the assumptions 
used in the valuation. The adviser must include a sensitivity analysis which 
sets out the impact of foreseeable material changes where relevant. Finally, the 
adviser must provide its opinion on the value for the subject of the evaluation.
The appropriateness of the methodology
The appropriate valuation method depends very much on the type of company. 
An adviser is left to make the choice of methodology based on his skill and 
judgment.49 When choosing valuation methodologies, however, the adviser 
is required to justify the reasons for such selection and its appropriateness. 
Whatever method is adopted, this should produce the highest and best 
value for the security or asset in question.50 One significance of stating the 
 42 Public Consultation Paper No 2/2010, supra, n 3 p 8.
 43 Renard, I and Santamaria, J, supra, n 39, [2012].
 44 Public Consultation Paper No 2/2010, supra, n 3, p 12.
 45 Public Consultation Paper No 2/2010, supra, n 3. See para 4.6.1(a)–(d).
 46 In contrast, the Australian regulatory guide states that “an expert should, when possible, 
use more than one valuation methodology”. It is worth noting that the SC has not come up 
with the detail guidelines. Perhaps the SC does not mean to impose that in all situations, 
an adviser must use more than one valuation methodology.
 47 Public Consultation Paper No 2/2010, supra, n 3, para 4.6.2.
 48 See Duke Group Ltd v Pilmer (1999) 31 ACSR 213 and Re EPHS Ltd [2002] ATP 12, cited in 
RG111.49.
 49 Public Consultation Paper No 2/2010, supra, n 3, para 4.6.1.
 50 Renard, I and Santamaria, J, supra, n 39, [2012].
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valuation methodologies adopted is to allow the professional adviser of the 
shareholder or the board of directors to replicate the adviser’s work and asses 
the valuation.51
In determining the appropriateness of the methodologies, the consultation 
paper provides the following factors for an adviser to consider.52 Firstly, when 
valuing listed securities where there is a liquid and active market, the adviser 
may take into consideration the market price for the securities. The adviser 
must also consider the possibility that the said market price may not reflect 
their real value. Secondly, the adviser may consider the discounted cash 
flow method and the estimated realisable value of any surplus assets of the 
company. Thirdly, the adviser may apply an appropriate earnings multiple to 
the estimated future maintainable earnings of the target company. Fourthly, 
the adviser may take into consideration the amount that would be available 
for distribution to shareholders in an orderly realisation of assets. Finally, an 
adviser may consider any precedent offer undertaken by another company as 
a basis for the valuation of the target’s securities. It should be noted that the 
list, however, is not exhaustive. An adviser is free to consider other factors 
which will assist in determining the right methodology to be adopted in 
the valuation process. It is worth noting that the factors enumerated above 
resemble those stated in the Australian regulatory guide.53 There are also 
decided cases in Australia which provide some guidance to independent 
advisers. In Re Weedmans Ltd54 it was held that a valuation based upon the 
amount which shareholders could realise assuming an orderly realisation of 
assets was an appropriate basis to use where it exceeded the price offered. 
However, this view was modified by Needham J in Wright Heaton Ltd v PDS 
Rural Products Ltd55 where it was held that, although the net tangible asset 
value exceeded the offer price, it was misleading to consider the net tangible 
assets because, for all practical purposes in the circumstances of the case, the 
value was unobtainable and therefore not its highest and best use.
The question of value ranges
The consultation paper obliges an adviser to place a range of values in the 
valuation process.56 Here, the advisers will have to consider, for example, 
the price offered to comparable companies in a takeover offer. The adviser 
must state where the target company stands when compared to comparable 
companies in terms of size of the companies, their assets backing, their net 
tangible assets, their return on assets etc. The consultation paper encourages 
 51 See RG 111.52.
 52 Public Consultation Paper No 2/2010, supra, n 3, para 4.6.2(a)–(d).
 53 See RG 111.53
 54 [1974] Qd R 377. Cited in Takeovers and Reconstructions in Australia, supra, n 39, [2012].
 55 [1982] 2 NSWLR 301; (1982) 7 ACLR 140; 1 ACLC 341. Cited in Renard, I and Santamaria, J, 
supra, n 39, [2012].
 56 Public Consultation Paper No 2/2010, supra, n 3, p 13
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the adviser to state the range as narrowly as possible in order to reflect the 
most accurate value for the target’s securities. Where the adviser is unable 
to give a narrow range owing to uncertainty, it must justify in the circular 
the factors which created the uncertainty; the adviser must also justify how, 
despite the uncertainty, it has reached its findings.57 There are a number of 
factors which may cause the adviser to be unable to provide a narrow range; 
a simple example would be where the target company’s size, asset backing 
etc. is far behind comparable companies. It is worth noting that a similar 
requirement in Australia which obliges advisers to give a narrow range was 
criticised by Hulme, who believes that “a range remains a range and it will 
sometimes be of significant width”.58
Evaluation of consideration other than cash
Where the bidder offers securities, whether listed or unlisted, as consideration, 
the adviser must examine the value of those securities and compare it with 
the valuation of the target’s securities.59 The adviser may take into account 
the control premium for the target company. Where the adviser uses the 
market price of the offer shares as a measure of the value of the consideration 
offered, the adviser may take into considerations the depth of the market for 
the shares offered as consideration and the volatility of the market price.60 The 
adviser may also want to consider whether or not the market value is likely 
to represent the post transaction value if the takeover offer is successful.61
“Reasonable”
Generally an offer is reasonable if it is fair. Can an offer be reasonable despite 
being not fair? The Consultation Paper suggests that the “reasonableness” 
of the offer should not be tied up to the value of the securities of the target. 
If we were to tie up the “fairness” of an offer to the value of the securities 
alone, it may then be possible to hold an offer to be “reasonable” based on 
other factors. In other words, “reasonableness” encompasses all other non-
quantitative factors which are considered material to shareholders in so far 
as it affects their decision-making on the matter they are required to consider 
or approve.62 It is worth noting that Renard and Santamaria observed that in 
practice, the lower the offer price is compared to the range which the expert 
considers as fair, the less likely it is that the expert will conclude that the 
offer is reasonable.63
 57 See Public Consultation Paper No 2/2010, supra, n 3, p 13.
 58 Hulme, supra, n 37 at 148.
 59 Public Consultation Paper No 2/2010, supra, n 3, para 4.5.1.
 60 Public Consultation Paper No 2/2010, supra, n 3, para 4.5.3.
 61 Public Consultation Paper No 2/2010, supra, n 3, para 4.5.3.
 62 Renard, I and Santamaria, J, supra, n 39, [2012].
 63 Renard, I and Santamaria, J, supra, n 39.
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In evaluating the “reasonableness” of the offer, the Commission suggests that 
the adviser take into consideration all factors which will lead or contribute to 
the offer to be considered “reasonable”.64 As a guide, the Commission suggests 
that the adviser consider a number of factors which include, among others, the 
existing control the bidder and its concert party have in the target company, 
the liquidity of the market for the target’s securities, pre-offer and post-offer 
performance of the market price of the target’s securities, the possibility of 
the major shareholders accepting the offer which will result in the offer being 
successful and the likelihood and value of alternative offers before the closure 
of the offer.65 The independent adviser may also want to consider any special 
value that the bidder will derive , including synergies that can be achieved, 
the benefits accruing to the bidder from increasing control in the target and 
whether the advantages and disadvantages of accepting an offer are greater 
to the bidder or the target.66 It is worth noting that the factors for the adviser 
to consider suggested above are similar to the Australian guidelines.67 Now 
that the term “reasonable” is defined by looking at other factors than the value 
of the securities, it is possible for the adviser, after considering all the relevant 
factors, to come to a conclusion that the offer is “reasonable” despite being “not 
fair”. In such a situation, the adviser must further explain the reasons why it 
considers the offer as “not fair” but “reasonable”. Thus despite the fact the 
adviser concludes that the offer undervalues the securities of the target, the 
adviser may state that the offer meets the standard of “reasonableness” where, 
for example, the offer is better than any alternative with which shareholders 
are likely to be presented. In such a situation, the proposed guidelines require 
the advisers to inform the shareholders how such conclusion will affect the 
course of action required of them.68
From the above discussion, it can be observed that the proposed Guidelines 
require the adviser to make two separate judgments, i.e. to state whether the 
offer is “fair” and whether it is “reasonable”, rather than reaching a single 
overall assessment. The approach suggested to the IAC clearly adopts the 
Australian approach. We also observe that the Australian Regulatory Guide 
in relation to experts’ reports has lent considerable assistance to the current 
review proposed by the Commission. However, it is worth noting that the 
decoupling of the phrase “fair” and “reasonable” in Australia does not come 
without criticism. In Re Rancoo,69 for instance, the expert report suggested that 
the selective capital reduction was “not fair” but “reasonable”, Hayne J stated:
it would seem to me that to divide the expression “fair and reasonable”… 
is to invite the expert to engage upon a task which requires consideration, 
 64 Public Consultation Paper No 2/2010, supra, n 3, para 4.1.4.
 65 Public Consultation Paper No 2/2010, supra, n 3, para 4.1.4.
 66 Public Consultation Paper No 2/2010, supra, n 3, para 4.1.4.
 67 See RG 111.12.
 68 Public Consultation Paper No 2/2010, supra, n 3, p 10, para 4.1.5.
 69 (1995) 17 ACSR 206.
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in the first case, of circumstances that may be divorced to some extent from 
those which in fact obtain, while at the same time requiring that expert, later, 
to give an overall assessment of the worth of the proposal … it is enough if I 
say that I doubt that is an approach that is particularly helpful in connection 
with a reduction of capital. Indeed in some cases it may obscure more than 
it illuminates.70
In the above case, the rationale advanced by the expert was that, while the 
return of capital to the outgoing shareholders was higher than its assessed 
value of the remaining shares in the company, an ancillary transaction was 
beneficial to the company which made the proposal “reasonable”. In a 
subsequent decision, Quatro Ltd v Argo Investments Ltd and others,71 a case 
also concerning reduction of capital, the court took note of the need to prove 
that the reduction is “fair and reasonable” to the shareholders. This case 
went to court after the amendments made to the Corporations Law which 
came into operation on July 1, 1998 where the court is no longer required to 
confirm a reduction of capital provided, among others, that the reduction is 
“fair and reasonable”. The court was of the opinion that the words “fair and 
reasonable” should carry the same meaning with “fair and equitable”. The 
court made reference to Re Allgas Energy Ltd,72 where Thomas J also used the 
expression “fair and reasonable” without stating that the expressions bore 
different meanings.
In Zenyth Therapeutics Ltd v Smith73 again the Supreme Court of Victoria 
considered the expert report but this time in relation to a scheme of arrangement. 
The expert here concluded that the scheme of arrangement was “not fair”; 
nevertheless it was “reasonable”. The defendant in this case opposed the 
option scheme principally on the basis that there was insufficient disclosure 
in the explanatory booklet about the rights of option holders in the event that 
the share scheme proceeded. The company acknowledged, in the explanatory 
booklet, the independent expert’s conclusion that the option scheme was “not 
fair” because for six series of options, the option scheme consideration was 
less than the independent expert’s assessed value. The defendant further 
argued that the independent expert advanced three distinct reasons why the 
option scheme was “reasonable” which were, on analysis, inadequate and 
unconvincing. The court was of the opinion that it should be cautious when 
dealing with expert reports which approve any scheme where the independent 
expert considers “not fair”, particularly when it may involve expropriation 
at an undervalue. The court observed:
 70 See also Ford, H A J, Austin, R P and Ramsay, I M, Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law 
(Sydney: LexisNexis Butterworths, looseleaf), at 23.510: “to inject an intermediate premise 
to the effect that the offer is unfair but reasonable seems unnecessary and confusing”.
 71 (1999) 32 ACSR 239; [1999] VSC 171.
 72 (1988) 27 ACSR 729.
 73 [2006] VSC 436.
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A scheme involving an offer of an undervalue, which is not fair, should 
not generally be considered reasonable unless it is accompanied by some 
positive compensatory feature. The fact that the security holders are unable 
to exact fair, or better, consideration through any avenue alternative to the 
scheme would not necessarily render an unfair scheme reasonable in the 
relevant sense … The independent expert’s conclusion that the scheme 
was reasonable, and in the option holder’s best interests, was not clear or 
logically compelling.
It can be observed that difficulties may arise where the adviser is of the 
opinion that the offer is “not fair” but “reasonable”. The real difficulty, in the 
author’s view, is when the advisers in Malaysia have to advise the shareholders 
to either accept or reject the offer which in their opinion is “not fair” but 
“reasonable”. This may place the advisers in a difficult position. Unless the 
advisers can offer logically compelling reasons when recommending the offer 
to be “reasonable” despite the fact that it is “not fair”, the advisers’ report 
may backfire or expose them to liability. In Australia, where an independent 
expert report is required, it will often form part of the basis for the directors’ 
recommendation. What the expert must do is to state whether, in the expert’s 
opinion, the offer is “fair” and “reasonable” and the justifications underlying 
such opinion. The expert is not required to state whether the shareholders 
should accept or reject the takeover offer. It is also worth noting that there 
have been two expert reports in relation to takeovers of a listed company on 
the ASX since January 1997 where the expert formed an opinion that the offer 
was “not fair” but “reasonable”.74 In Malaysia, since the publication of the 
Consultation Paper, the author observed that out of seven IACs which adhere 
to the suggestion to treat “fair and reasonable” as a non-composite phrase, 
only one suggests that the offer is “not fair” but “reasonable”.
Conclusion
The move by the Commission to decouple the term “fair” and “reasonable” 
in the IAC is aimed at providing assistance for the shareholders to make an 
informed decision; in other words, it seeks to protect the shareholders when 
deciding on the offer. Will the proposed changes enhance the IAC and provide 
a better tool for the shareholders? After examining the IACs, the author finds 
that those IACs prepared in mid-2010 show improvement. The advisers, for 
example, do not only state the price of comparable companies or condition 
of the industry. They have also included their comment after analysing the 
research database. Advisers have also confined themselves to the value factor 
alone when considering the “fairness” of the offer. The “reasonableness” of 
the offer, on the other hand, is assessed by looking at factors other than the 
value of the offer. This obviously reflects that the current IACs are prepared 
with close guidance by the Commission in meeting the objective of the 
 74 See http://www.connect4.com.au.
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law. Despite the fact that the term “fair and reasonable” is not treated as a 
compound phrase and has departed from the normal usage, it has to some 
extent allowed the shareholders to be enlightened when reaching their 
conclusion on the fairness and reasonableness of the offer. It also allows the 
shareholders to know the reasons upon which the advisers based their opinion 
on the fairness and reasonableness of the offer. Having mentioned that, it is 
also important to take note that besides relying on the IACs, shareholders 
with specific investment objectives are advised to refer to their respective 
advisers to advise them further on the fairness and reasonableness of the 
offer to meet their investment objective.
The court must also take a similar approach when defining the terms “fair 
and reasonable” when considering matters falling under transactions which 
require the preparation of IACs. It is also hoped that based on the proposal in 
the Consultation Paper the Commission will clearly lay down the guidelines 
for the independent advisers; the same guidelines should be able to assist 
the court, where dispute arises, when determining whether an offer is “fair” 
and “reasonable”.
